Alexander Sergeevich Koretsky

The work addresses an urgent scientific task of increasing the efficiency of public procurement management in the context of information asymmetry via the use of modern mechanisms and digital technologies. The subject of the work was formed by the study of the negative effects of information asymmetry on the stakeholders at the stage of selecting a supplier, as well as qualitative aspects of planning, budgeting and preparation of purchases by government customers. The theoretical basis is the theory of markets with asymmetric information, the theory of contracts, as well as the theory and practice of the process approach to management regarded in many significant world economic studies. The relevance of the work is justified by the expansion in the state sector, where procurement efficiency becomes of particular importance, and the constant displacement of high-quality goods, works and services from the market and their replacement with low-quality ones (the phenomenon of negative selection) becomes an obvious risk. In the light of the tasks facing the state, the author views the demand for development of a conceptual model and methodology for using digital mechanisms and modern information technologies both for microeconomic regulation and assistance to quality suppliers, and for increasing the efficiency of government bodies, state corporations, companies and enterprises