Pavel Alexandrovich Levakov

At present many markets may be viewed as multisided with platforms where different groups of agents interact. However, many aspects of these markets are still not thoroughly studied, including the competition between platforms with the goal to increase user base. As noted in many theoretical works, due to the phenomenon of zero prices, non-price factors of competition play a leading role on such markets. Among others the importance of exclusive contracts is highlighted in scientific literature, but empirically their effect on the user base has not been fully estimated. In this study we examine video game market since its importance in global economy has increased in the recent decades. The effect of exclusivity on the total video game platforms’ sales and on the sales volumes of individual video games is empirically estimated. As an additional control variable, the age rating of video games is included, which was not considered in prior works. Drawing on the results of estimating econometric model, the author concludes that for platforms on the video game market it is advantageous to increase the share of exclusive contracts, but this relationship is characterized by diminishing returns to scale. On the other hand, for video game developers exclusive distribution on a particular platform results in lower overall sales. Based on these results it can be concluded that platforms can compete for exclusive contracts and in the process of negotiating for exclusivity a compensation from the platform should be provided to video game developers.