Moscow University Bulletin. Economics. 2023. 2.

This paper examines the specifics of interdisciplinary synthesis in modern social sciences. The author argues that currently economists do not “intervene” on to the “territory” of adjacent social sciences but rather export concepts from their disciplines into economics. The article reveals the reasons for the decline in the interest of social scientists in “grand theories” and highlights the factors that conditioned the rise of the so-called quantitative turn in social sciences. The author demonstrates the correlation between the empirical turn in social sciences and the promotion of interdisciplinarity. The analysis allows to state that the main driver enhancing the dialogue between representatives of various scientific fields is the growing unity of the analytical toolkit used by scholars. As a result, more and more researchers identify themselves through the analytical methods they use. Drawing on the papers prepared by the participants of the conference “Paradoxes of Peter the Great’s reforms: lessons for the economy of modern Russia”, held at the Faculty of Economics of Lomonosov Moscow State University on September 21, 2022 and formed this issue of Lomonosov Economics Journal, the author examines the manifestations of interdisciplinary approach in Russian social sciences. It has been identified that, unlike their international colleagues, Russian social scientists are united not so much by common analytical toolkit, but by the desire to fit their research into a broad theoretical framework, which over the past decades is represented by diverse types of institutionalism.

The scope of the personality of Peter the Great questions the logic of his large-scale reforms in practical terms. It began along with the war, coincided with the war, and in a number of key issues was determined by the need to wage the war, arm and supply the army, and restructure its management. Attention to his reforms is connected not so much with the anniversary of Peter I in 2022, but with the need to understand the historical path of Russia and to form the country's cultural code under the influence of his reforms. Starting with a humble goal of opening a “window to Europe”, after 1714 administrative reforms became more extensive and comprehensive. The logic of the reforms was determined not only by the aspiration to Europe and not by the teleology of creating an empire. It was more about the pragmatic need to use the window of opportunity to get out of the “ring track” of a vast forest power squeezed by three imperial (regardless of titles) neighbors of other faiths — Turkey, Poland and Sweden. The course and needs of the Northern War to a large extent determined the nature of the reforms, with the success in the war resulting in the formation of the empire. The paper formulates possible alternative ways of Russia's development at the turn of the 16th–17th centuries, uses the methodology inherent in the new institutional economic school to compare discrete structural alternatives that stand in the way of the country and the hero of the article at two critical time points. The reforms outcomes and the war gave the country a chance for development, though a large-scale transition to more mature European socio-economic institutions could not be implemented in this short period and under war conditions.

The article considers the reforms of Peter I from the standpoint of historical sociology and institutional economic theory with the aim to identify the features of Peter's modernization and its role in forming Russia’s path dependence, and this purpose is realized by comparing it with Stalin's modernization. The study rests on the division of modernization into two types: adaptation and westernization models. This division constitutes the methodological basis of the study and allows further use of comparative analysis in reviewing Peter’s and Stalin’s modernization. Peter's reforms are viewed as adaptive modernization: the 17th century formal institutions of Muscovy were replaced by imported (Western) ones, but at the same time basic components of the political system and political culture were preserved. The reforms resulted in a fully state-driven society and developed economy. Totalitarianism in Russia first took shape in the early 18th century. It combined the archaic institutions of Muscovy newly introduced imported ones. The latter strengthened autocratic rule, powerproperty as an institutional foundation of Russia. At the same time, cultural and everyday westernization was built into Peter's reforms. It subsequently became the basis of in-depth westernization in the form of the release of the nobility from compulsory service. A comparative analysis of the Peter’s and Stalin’s modernization showed that they have both common features and differences. Total nationalization of life, focus on militarization, despotism unite them. However, while Peter's modernization transformed the archaic society, Stalin's one revived the archaic in the place of westernized society of the early 20th century.

In modern Russia Peter the Great, according to representative opinion polls, is considered to be the best figure in the entire history of the country, significantly outstripping in popularity even domestic politicians of the 20th–21st centuries. This very high “folk” reputation significantly contradicts the views of social scientists who see in Peter I not so much a successful national reformer, a “revolutionary on the throne”, but a despot unscrupulous in his means, who for centuries to come linked modernization of the country with increased state coercion and heavy wars. However, comparative approach shows that other countries of catching up development pattern in the XVIII–XX centuries followed as a rule not the path of evolutionary reform but that of radical reforms aimed primarily at strengthening the army. Peter's Russia stands out against this background only in that it was the first to choose “modernization for the sake of military victories” and therefore, since the time of Peter I, remained among the “great powers” despite constant socio-economic backwardness. The legitimacy of this choice can be substantiated with the help of a world-systems analysis that emphasizes the great role of national sovereignty for the success of catch-up modernization. In fact, Peter I chose the war with strong Sweden as a main lever of modernization and a way to radically change the “rules of the game” — not only to open direct trade between Russia and Western Europe, but also to include it in the “great powers”. The example of Peter the Great's reforms, which almost coincided with the Northern War, clearly shows that military mobilization can play the role of a “big push” in a country that is catching up, creating the prerequisites for all other qualitative transformations. At the same time, “modernization for the sake of victories” that took shape under Peter the Great initiated a trend that is dangerous for Russia as a country of catching up development, when its military successes hindered the seemingly unnecessary national modernization, with military failures stimulating it.

The theory of military revolution is known to describe the process of transformation of states in Early modern period with the appearance of armed with firearms regular armies. According to the Brian Downing model, this process consists of several successive steps. 1. The starting point in development is the medieval monarchy, where the power of the suzerain is limited to meetings (conditionally, “parliaments”), where aristocrats predominate, managing the resources of their land holdings. 2. The military revolution downgrades the value of chivalry and requires the creation of a large army of firearmswielding mercenary infantrymen. 3. Funding a new army requires the reallocation of resources to the detriment of the nobility. 4. “Parliaments” resist these demands, with the conflict between the monarchs and the nobility starting. 5. The new army ensures the victory of monarchs. 6. The monarchs abolish “parliaments” or deprive them of real powers that means the victory of absolutism. 7. Further, the victorious monarchs subjugate the nobility, taking away part of their resources. 8. Reforms start, with a new financial system created. 9. New bureaucracy is created, with commoners recruited for positions. 10. The nobility tries to fit into these new structures by taking office positions. The article focuses on testing the Downing model on the material of Peter I transformations and shows that Russian historical process of the second half of the 17th — early 18th centuries actually went through the ten steps mentioned above

The system of job positions and ranks, which is currently in operation in modern civil service in Russia, is similar to the Table of ranks introduced by Peter the Great in 1722. This article studies the evolution of this institution, exploring its advantages and disadvantages. The Table of ranks, being a part of Peter the Great’s project of modernization, played an important role in organizing civil service. Civil servant’s career was determined by the length of service, merits and education. Originally, ranks coincided with job positions, but by the end of the XVIII century they diverged, with the length of service becoming a priority for job promotion. The XIX century saw an increase in the number of civil servants and gradual decrease in the share of the nobility in the total number of civil servants. During this period there were several attempts, however unsuccessful, to reform or to cancel the system of ranks. In October 1917 the Bolsheviks cancelled all ranks and titles. In the Soviet period, ranks were established for diplomats and public prosecutors. The system of ranks was renewed in early XXI century with the Federal law on “State civil service in the Russian Federation” adopted in 2004 and several Presidential decrees issued later. In fact, it was a new Table of ranks which was very close to that of Peter the Great’ The number of ranks increased from 14 to 15, some of their names are nearly identical. However, the system of modern job positions is much more complicated than in XVIII century. So far, the correspondence between ranks and job positions is determined only for the top-level positions. The significance of the new Table of ranks for an effective civil service is still to be determined.

The usual image of Peter I in the current public opinion is the great Russian emperor, who carried out a deep modernization of Russia, borrowing the best examples of Western culture, created a fleet, built a new capital of Russia — St. Petersburg, won a some of major military victories. Nevertheless, many historians assess the achievements of Peter the Great as very controversial: the location of the new capital was chosen very poorly, a sharp increase in tax exemptions repeatedly led to famine in the empire, which, in turn, led to a reduction in the population in the old Russian lands. Subsequently, part of the expensive fleet subsequently rotted, too large an army had to be reduced, the capital returned to Moscow for a while. The sharp strengthening of absolutism was accompanied by an increase in the enslavement of the peasants. Cultural innovations, including education, extended only to a very narrow layer of noble children. The backward class institutions hindered not only technological innovation, but also the freedom of enterprise. The adoption of the Table of Ranks exacerbated the problem of the “principal — agent” relationship, which was accompanied not only by the growth of corruption and favoritism, but also emergence of the dichotomy “rich state — poor population”, which has since become traditional for Russia. Therefore, in the light of the analysis from the standpoint of the new political economy, the assessment of the reforms of Peter the Great looks rather negative, the contribution of this politician looks incomparable both with the achievements of Alexei Mikhailovich “The Quietest” and with the reforms of Alexander II “The Liberator”. However, these statesmen are hardly present in contemporary Russian public opinion. This paradox is revealed in the article through the use of tools of political theology — Peter the Great is a necessary figure in the modern liberal-patriotic “civil religion”, while Alexander II, on the contrary, is associated with the “guilt complex” of the Russian intelligentsia, and his reforms must be characterized in a negative way. This largely predetermines the presets of modern researchers. At the same time, the sacredness of the image.

Considering that the bulk of domestic and foreign literature is devoted to reforms in the field of state administration, the creation of regular army and navy, and much less attention is paid to the analysis of the evolution of the agricultural sector of Russia during Peter the Great period and the impact of reforms on this — the most important at that time — sector of the economy, this work aims to contribute to overcoming the said limitation. The article traces the changes in the agricultural sector caused by the reform activity of Peter the Great. It is proposed to divide all the consequences of his reforms into two major groups: intentional consequences, that is, originally conceived by the reformer, and unintended ones, which were side effects of the reforms carried out by the government. Traditionally, Peter's agricultural initiatives are considered either in chronological order or on an industry-by-industry basis. In this article, it is proposed to consider them from the point of view of the tasks that these innovations were designed to solve. It is shown that most of the innovations initiated by Peter were caused either by the increased demand for raw materials and food from industry and new cities or were solving problems related to the on-going wars and therefore were mostly of a shortterm nature. Also in the article, from the point of view of modernization theory, the institutional consequences of Peter the Great's reform activities for agriculture in the Russian Empire are considered. It is shown that institutional reforms had long-term unintended consequences and formed an institutional framework that was not completely destroyed even by the abolition of serfdom. The work provides evidence that the restriction of land ownership rights took place long before Peter's reforms. The data demonstrating rather weak development of the land market in the first half of the XVIII century are given. The article concludes that most of the reforms undertaken during the reign of Peter the Great were a continuation of the trend of previous periods consisting in property rights restricting for both landowners and peasants..

The reign of Peter the Great (1682–1725) is known not only for transforming Russia into a powerful empire but for a radical change in its economy and rapid industrial development. These changes were dictated by the Northern War with the Swedes and Peter's ideas onto how to manage the economy. The article examines two main aspects of the policy — in relation to trade and industry. For Russia’s merchants this era was a difficult time entailing their actual ruin. Huge taxes and various duties were imposed on merchants and townspeople in general with state active intervention in business, taking it away from entrepreneurs and introducing monopolies for purchase and sale of raw materials and goods. Only towards the end of Peter I reign the system of pressure on merchants weakened. Industry followed a different path: the state used all its means to develop manufacturing. Officials took special care of the sectors focused on military needs. The authorities launched a broad program of protectionism, they in every way assisted the organizers of production, with finance, benefits, protecting the enterprises from foreign competition. It resulted in greenhouse conditions for industrial development. A special issue was labor force at enterprises: the government developed the procedure of attaching local peasants to factories, allowing the owners of manufactories to buy out serfs. These measures contributed to the transformation of industry into a kind of serfdom. All this had an extremely negative impact on the formation of Russian capitalism and the future of Russia..

The article attempts to identify the most significant lessons that can be learned from the experience of Peter the Great transformations— one of the key developments in Russian history that determined the vector of the country's development for a long time. The author considers both positive and negative implications of Peter the Great's reforms, and concludes that the success of Peter I reforms was primarily due to the fact that their focus on the European model of development correlated with internal trends in Russian development at the turn of the 17th–18th centuries, and this is exactly what made Peter I transformations irreversible. Peter's successors, faced with serious financial and economic problems, were forced to make certain adjustments to his transformations, but retained all the main institutions he created. Thanks to Peter's transformations, Russia acquired the status of a great power, which was due to the country's integration into the system of international relations, the world economy and culture, without which the very status of a great power lost its meaning. Thanks to the reforms in economic sphere, the technological gap with the leading European countries was largely overcome, but the priority development of industries focused on military needs and based on the labor of serfs hindered the development of capitalist relations and contributed to the transformation of Russia into a raw material power. At the same time, the pace of economic development remained low, which resulted in a new lag in the next historical stage. Reforms in the social sphere, based on meeting fiscal needs of the state, hampered but could not stop the development of Russian society.